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Something was wrong with the 40-year-old schoolteacher from Virginia.'
From all outward appearances he seemed to be living a completely normal life.2
What others did not know was that he had begun collecting child pornography,
soliciting prostitutes, and making sexual advances toward his stepdaughter.3
Eventually his wife found out and he was ordered either to complete a
Sexaholics Anonymous program or face jail time.4 Despite the threat of jailtime,
he failed the program because he could not stop himself from asking the other
members for sexual favors.' The night before he was scheduled for sentencing,
the man went to a hospital and complained of severe headaches.' During his
hospitalization the man continued acting out and even propositioned nurses.7
Doctors performed a neurologic exam and discovered a large brain tumor
displacing his orbitofrontal lobe.8 After the tumor was removed, the deviant
urges subsided and he was allowed to return home.'
* J.D. Candidate, May2005, Washington and Lee University School of Law, B.A, Colgate
University, May 1999. The author would like to thank the members of the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse, especially Professor Roger D. Groot, Philip H Yoon, and Joseph Dunn, for their
insight and support. The author would also like to thank Michael Sartor for his love, patience, and
incomparable wisdom. This article is dedicated to Sonny, myforever dog, for teaching me how to
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1. Jeffrey M. Burns, MD. & Russell H Swerdlow, M.D., Rig&t Oq Tuwmr Wth
Peqhilia Synptomand Co oaIApraxia Sig?; 60 ARO-IIVES OF NEUROL. 437, 437-38 (2003).





7. Crinr Agzimt Chlam- Ptqpbdia, 2ND SIGHT MAGAZINE (July 28, 2003), at
http://secondsightresearch.tripod.com/zine/id56.html.
8. Burns & Swerdlow, supra note 1, at 438.
9. Id
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Approximately one year later, the headaches returned and the man once
again began collecting pornography.0 Brain scans revealed that the tumor had
begun to regrow and surgerywas once again necessary.1 Just like the first time,
the tumor was removed and the deviant behavior ceased. 2 Doctors concluded
that the tumor was preventing the frontal lobes from functioning properly and
was thereby causing the sociopathic behavior." Apparently, the tumor both
stimulated the sexual urges and prevented the man from controlling his impulses
to act on the urges. 4
The implications of this discoveryhave the potential to alter much of what
we know about the human brain and criminality. Albeit an extreme example, the
case of the Virginia schoolteacher highlights the well documented connection
between criminal behavior and brain dysfunction.15 In particular, studies show
that the frontal lobes are instrumental in regulating socially appropriate
behavior. 6 If the frontal lobes are damaged, an individual may lose the ability
to control abnormal impulses. 7 Thus, a frontally damaged individual is more
likely to commit "criminal" acts because his ability to judge situations and act
appropriately has been compromised.
Despite the scientific evidence, the legal system has in large part failed to
address the implications of frontal lobe dysfunction in the criminal process.
Frontal lobe dysfunction does not fit neatly into either a diminished capacity or
an insanity defense. The strongest use for evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction
is in the mitigation context. As the scientific evidence regarding the effects of
frontal lobe dysfunction grows, more lawyers will begin to present frontal lobe
dysfunction defenses. Courts will be forced to address the effect of such evi-
dence on the capital sentencing process. The United States Supreme Court has
10. Id
11. I
12. Crnr Azimt C iL s"pra note 7.
13. Burns &Swerdlow, supra note 1, at 437.
14. Chris Kahn, Dcos Hoamin onteSitecfE il in d BMin, CAPE ARGUS, 6, 8 uly 30,
2003), http://capeargus.co.za/index.php?fSectionId-342&fArticLeld-198818 (stating that it was
.possible the turnour released some pre-existing urges" causing the man to "lose[] the ability to
control impulses").
15. SeRenato M.E. Sabbatini, 7he Psdxpath's Braitr Tonr'ai Scak, Di zei Braim, BRAIN
& MIND, 2 (1998), at http'J/www.epub.org.br/cm/no7/doencas/disease ihtm (stating that
"[m]any studies have shown in the last 20 years that murderers and ultraviolnt criminals have a
startling evidence of brain disease").
16. Se Ned Potter, Siar Pauezm See i Munm' Braim, 7, at
http://www.peventdisease.com/news/articles/uniquepattems murders brains.shtml (last visited
Mar. 18, 2004) (discussing how the frontal lobes are responsble for controlling impulses and
drives).




held that it is cruel and unusual punishment to execute mentallyretarded individ-
uals because their abilityto reason and control urges is compromised. 8 Individ-
uals with frontal lobe dysfunction lack "the ability to control impulses or antici-
pate the consequences of choices."19 Some death penaltyexperts believe that the
natural extension of the Supreme Court's decision would be to render people
with brain dysfunction death-ineligible.
20
This article discusses the effect of frontal lobe dysfunction on behavior and
the most effective use of such evidence in a capital murder case. Part II will
examine the scientific aspects of frontal lobe dysfunction including, the symp-
toms and the relationship between dysfunction and criminality. Part III will
explain the ways in which frontal lobe damage maybe used as a valid defensive
posture in a capital murder case. In particular, this Part will examine the use of
frontal lobe dysfunction evidence in a diminished capacitydefense, in an insanity
defense, and as mitigating evidence during sentencing proceedings. Finally, Part
IV will discuss how defense counsel can effectivelyexplain frontal lobe dysfunc-
tion to the jury without offending individual notions of free will and morality.
I. Sd~m*AnI)sS
A. The Fmntal L os: A neany and Fwtmi
Before successfullydeveloping a defense based on frontal lobe dysfunction,
a lawyer must first know what the frontal lobes are and how they function. The
frontal lobes make up approximately "one-third of the surface of each hemi-
sphere including the motor cortex" 21 They are generally considered to consist
of three overlapping regions known as the cingulate gyrus, the dorsolateral
region, and the orbital frontal lobe. 2 The frontal lobes are located at the anterior
of the skull behind the forehead.23 Although the areas overlap, they are clearly
distinct anatomical regions responsible for controlling separate functions.2 One
18. Se Akins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002) (holding that the execution of a mentally
retarded person violates the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment).
19. SeeKahn, sra note 14, 8.
20. Id 113.
21. Andrew Kertesz, Laqwg and the Fwntal Lobe, in THE HUMAN FRONTAL LOBES:
FuNClom AND DISORDERS 261,261 (Bruce L. Mifler &Jeffrey L Cummings eds., 1999).
22. JONATHAN H PINCUS, M.D., BASE IMs ITNCIS: WHAT MAKES KILLERS KILL) 238 n.1
(2001) [hereinafter PINaE, BasehIrbians]. The cingulate gyrus is shaped like a "C' and extends from
the front of the brain, along the middle, to the back of the brain. Id The dorsolateral region is near
the temples, and the orbital frontal lobe lays at the front of the brain above the eyes. Id
23. Id
24. See Daniel I. Kaufer & David A. Lewis, Fmttal Lobe A natcw ard Cohiads Cavi* in
THE HUMANFRONTAL LOBES: FUNCrOiS AND DISORDERS, sura note 21, at 27,27 (discussing
the multiple regions and circuits comprising the frontal lobes of the brain).
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way to conceptualize how the frontal lobes work is by looking at their relation-
ship to the rest of the brain. One scholar has discussed this relationship by
stating that if the brain were an aircraft then the frontal lobes would be the
pilot." Like a plane, the brain is a complex "machine" that needs the guidance
and control of the frontal lobes in order to function properly. 6 The primary role
of the frontal lobes is to mediate what are commonly referred to as our "execu-
tive functions."" These functions include the ability to plan, make judgments,
and behave accordingly.28 The frontal lobes control these higher level cognitive
functions. The prefrontal, or orbitofrontal, cortex "mediates empathic, civil, and
socially appropriate behavior, personalitychange is the hallmark of orbitofrontal
dysfunction."29 It is this area of the frontal lobes which is most frequently the




In order to recognize a possible defense based on frontal lobe dysfunction,
lawyers must be aware of the various types of disorders which affect brain
functioning. Frontal lobe dysfunction is most commonly caused by some sort
of trauma to the head. Because the frontal lobes are located at the front of the
skull, they are particularly susceptible to closed head trauma." One cause of
closed head trauma is the "sudden forces of acceleration/deceleration exerted
upon [the] ski" during automobile accidents. 2 It is not uncommon for acci-
dent victims to suffer "mild frontal lobe dysfunction" from this type of injury.3
In addition, manypeople involved in car accidents do not realize that they may
25. GOOD SAMARITAN CENTER FOR CONNGO REHABIUTATIoN, FRONTAL LOBE
INJURY 1,aThttp://www.biawa.org/pax/generic/Frontal%20Lobe%20Injury.doc (last visited Jan.
28, 2004).
26. Id
27. PINCUS, Base Instinx, supra note 22, at 233 n.6.
28. Id
29. Tiffany W. Chow & Jeffrey L. Cummings, Frctal.Suoniml Cin ut, in THE HUMAN
FRONTAL LOBES: FUNCIONS AND DISORDERS, s"ia note 21, at 3, 6.
30. See gwraly Leonard Abel, PE T Study Loa4g Inide The MiArk fMurIees, 1 CRIME
TIMEs 1 (1995), athttp://216.117.159.91/crimetims/95a/w95apl.htm (relating the results of a
study lnking prefrontal lobe dysfunction to criminal behavior).
31. SoeBruce Peterson, MildFna JLohe Qsfiuaion" The Sa*iditm CattantoMddo L eg
Assssnrwa, 20 QUEENSL. L. Soc'Y J. 53, 55 (1990) (addressing the role lawyers should play in
identifying frontal lobe dysfunction).
32. Id at 54.
33. Id at 53-54.
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have suffered frontal lobe damage. Accident victims may notice abnormal
behavior but mistakenly attribute such behavior to "emotional instability or
inabilityto cope" with the accident.14 It is important for lawyers to examine their
clients' historyto uncover car accidents or other possible causes of trauma to the
brain. Periods of unconsciousness or amnesia are good indicators that an
accident may have been severe enough to have caused frontal lobe damage.3"
Frontal lobe dysfunction can also result from disease. Cerebrovascular
disease, a condition affecting blood vessels in the brain, can cause strokes or
hemorrhages that damage the frontal lobes. 6 Frontotemporal dementias,
conmonlyseen in aging adults, are characterized bya degeneration of the frontal
lobes."7 Acquired diseases, like Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, herpes- related enceph-
alitis, Human Inumunodeficiency~irus, and Lyme Disease also mayaffect frontal
lobe functioning.38 As discussed in the case of the Virginia schoolteacher, brain
tumors can cause frontal lobe dysfunction.39 By reviewing a client's medical
history, defense counsel may uncover a possible cause of frontal lobe dysfunc-
tion resulting from these conditions or other similar diseases.
2. Syntom
Frontal lobe dysfunction is characterized by both cognitive and behavioral
deficits. Depending on which regions of the frontal lobe are damaged, different
symptoms can occur.4" Damage to the prefrontal cortex is generally associated
with behavioral changes; damage to the dorsolateral region results in cognitive
dysfunction.4' Common cognitive disturbances include problems with memory,
motor skills, spatial processing, attention, verbal fluency, and concentration.42
34. Id at 54.
35. Id
36. Helena Chui & Lee Willis, VasaidarDiseocfttJeFmnra1Lobs, inTHE HUMAN FRONTAL
LOBES: FUNCTIONS AND DISORDER, supra note 21, at 370, 378-79.
37. Ame Brun & Lars Gustafson, (Iinizi an PadW Asps fFnmndweomw E%* in
THIE HUMAN FRONTAL LOBES: FUCIONS AND DISORDERS, sup'a note 21, at 346, 350.
38. Douglas W. Scharre,L#kii, Iqwaon~g andDv Dionen cf& FmntaLd,
in T-E HUMANFRONTAL LOBES: FUNCTIONS AND DISORDERS, supa note 21, at 461, 461-62.
39. Sw Bums & Swerdlow, sura note 1, at 438 (stating that the patient's tumor "displac[ed]
the right orbitofrontal cortex and distorted] the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex"); Tomoko Y.
Nakawatase, Fmnta1L obe Tums, in THE HUMANFRoNTAL LOBES: FUNCTIONS AND DISORDERS,
su"-a note 21, at 436, 436 (discussing the types of frontal lobe tumors, their manifestations, and
diagnosis techniques).
40. Scharre, supa note 38, at 461.
41. SwElenPerecran, Copdownfs anthteMeta-F wxtiofheFrmalLd: SetintheStage,
in TI-E FRONTALLOBES REVISITED 1, 1 (Ellen Perecman ed. 1987) (explaining the role the frontal
lobes play in cognitive, intellectual, and behavioral functions).
42. Id;;seSusan E. McPherson &JeffreyL. Cummings, TheNoqfsyhrq ttheFntaLob,
2004]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
Many behavioral deficits resulting from damage to the prefrontal region are
associated with a disruption of the "executive functions.""3 "Executive functions
are comprised of four principal neuropsychological components: (1) goal
formulation, (2) planning, (3) carrying out goal-directed behaviour, and (4) the
abilityto monitor effective performance."" Perhaps the most notable behavioral
effect of frontal lobe dysfunction is personality change.45 Frontally damaged
individuals often displaymarked apathy, tactlessness, impulsivity, irritability, and
the inabilityto "empathize with the feelings of others."' Some researchers refer
to "emotional blunting" to describe the apathetic attitude associated with frontal
lobe dysfunction.47 On the other end of the spectrum, damage to the frontal
lobes can cause disinhibited or pseudopsychopathic behavior.4" Because the
frontal lobes regulate the abilities to control impulses, to reason, and to make
sociallyresponsible judgments, damage to the frontal lobes is a significant cause
of violent and aggressive behavior.49 If those areas fail to function properly, a
person may act impulsively and inappropriately. The associated inabilityto act
in a "civilized" manner often results in increased criminality."
Characteristics such as failure in school, unemployment, and poverty are
frequentlyassociated with prefrontal abnormalities."1 Some studies "suggest that
prefrontal cortex dysfunction may interact with environmental, social, and
psychological influences, leading to criminal behavior." 2 In addition, the
manifestation of these types of indicators may be helpful in determining the
point at which the frontal lobe disorder developed. An adult who exhibits
"recurrent impulsive, aggressive, and antisocial behaviour" may have suffered
in DISORDERS OF BRAIN AND MIND 11, 13, 19 (Maria A. Ron & Anthony S. David eds. 1998)
(isting the tests used to assess cognitive and behavioral ability.
43. McPherson & Cummings, s"pra note 42, at 16.
44. Id
45. Id at 19.
46. See Cow & Cummings, supra note 29, at 6-7 (describing the behavioral changes
associated with orbitofrontal dysfunction).
47. Mchael H. Thimble, P)Sqaf q Fmrta! Lc& Synkm. , 7, at
http://www.ect.org/effects/lobe.html (1990).
48. Chow & Cummings, s"pra note 29, at 6-7.
49. See Jonathan H. Pincus, A~rsin Ciniulin and the Fnva Ld, in THE HUMAN
FRONTAL LOBES: FUNcrIOms AND DISORDERS, supr note 21, at 547,547-49 (hereinafter Pincus,
Agnssicn] (discussing a study involving murderers and the link between frontal lobe damage and
cniminaity).
50. See Abel, supra note 30, at 1 (discussing the possibility that the frontal lobes "may





from organic brain disorder since early childhood. 3 If, however, the behavioral
and cognitive indicators cannot be traced throughout the patient's history, then
it is more likely that the brain dysfunction resulted from trauma or disease.
3. Tetmg
There are various techniques available that enable doctors to determine if
someone is suffering from brain tumors or other forms of frontal lobe dysfunc-
tion. Initially, brain abnormalities are indicated by a patient's particular symp-
toms and prior medical history. A general neurological exam that evaluates a
patient's eye movement, hearing, reflexes, sensation, balance, and coordination
is useful in detecting brain tumors.54 After performing a preliminaryneurological
exam, doctors will turn to more advanced imaging techniques. A computed
tomography ("C=") scan uses x-rays and sometimes iodine dye to produce an
image of the patient's brain. 5 Magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") takes
pictures at different angles so doctors can see three dimensional images 6 MRIs
are the preferred test for distinguishing between healthy and diseased tissue and
are useful in detecting increases or decreases in "overall prefrontal grey matter
volume."57 Positron emission tomography ("PET") scans are different from CT
scans or MRIs in that theyshow metabolic activity rather than brain structure."
To perform a PET scan, doctors inject either sugar or an amino acid that con-
tains a radioactive tracer, and the scan measures the levels of the injected agents
in the brain.59 PET scans are better than other tests at detecting recurrent
tumors and distinguishing between benign and malignant tumors.' ° If the test
detects a tumor, surgeons perform a biopsy in order to examine the cells and
make a precise diagnosis.61 PET scans can also detect non-tumor related frontal
53. Sw MVLC Brower & B.H- Price, Nealry&ty qFr,! Lobe Djsfwzd in Vio/en and
Cyiniml Bdahezia A Cr iialRemeu4 71 J. NEUROL NEURosURG. & PSYCHIATRY 720, 721 (2001)
(discussing the relationship between criminal behavior and frontal lobe dysfunction),
http://janp.bnijournas.com/cgi/reprint/71/6/720.pdf.
54. See THE BRAIN TUMOR SoCY, How ARE BRAIN TUMORS DIAGNOSED, 2, at
http://www.tbts.org/virtual-html/diagnose.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004) (discussing the various
methods used to diagnose brain tumors).
55. Id 5.
56. Id Unlike a CT scan, MRIs do not use radiation and take better pictures of tumors on
or near bone. Id 16.
57. Sw Brower & Price, supra note 53, at 723 (discussing the ability of an MRI to detect
"frontal grey matter reductions").






lobe dysfunction bymeasuring blood flow and metabolic changes.62 An electro-
encephalogram ("EEG") uses electrodes to measure electrical impulses in the
brain.63 EEGs are an important tool in detecting structural brain abnormalities
by measuring brain activity levels."
Other types of diagnostic tools can be used to detect more specific frontal
lobe dysfunction. Both the Stroop Interference Test and the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test can be used to assess an individual's frontal lobe functioning.65
Neuropsychological testing can be particularly helpful at indicating specific
orbitofrontal dysfunction.6 6 The Iowa Gambling Task tests a subject's abilityto
make safe and ultimatelyprofitable decisions bydelaying reward for the ultimate
good.67 Frontally damaged individuals fare poorly on this test due to their
propensity to seek instant gratification.68
Frontal lobe dysfunction often goes undiagnosed because the
symptomatologyis similar to personalitydisorders.69 It is common for frontally
damaged individuals to be diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder ("ADHD"), Antisocial PersonalityDisorder ("APD"), and Obsessive
Compulsive Disorder ("OCD").° Lawyers often accept a diagnosis of personal-
ity disorder after a psychological examination and fail to pursue further testing. 1
62. SeBrower & Price, supra note 53, at 723-24 (describing a studythat used PET scans to
show decreased "cortical blood flow or metabolism" corresponding to violent behavior).
63. Se gerally Medlie Phus Mediad Erm"da EE G, Medline Plus, at
http://www.nnnih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003931.htm (Nov. 14,2002) (explaining the
use of EEGs).
64. Id; se Brower & Price, supra note 53, at 722 (discussing clinical findings regarding the
occurrence of abnormal EEGs in individuals who exhibit violent or criminal behavior).
65. Bums & Swerdlow, sura note 1, at 440.
66. Id
67. Id
68. Id The test involves four decks of cards containing cards that offer either a financial gain
or loss. Id Two decks contain a few cards that result in substantial payoffs, but overall leave a
player in debt. Id The other two decks provide more modest gains or losses, but if a player
chooses from these decks he will incur a net financial gain. Id 'tis paradigm can distinguish
individuals with orbitofrontal dysfunction from control individuals because it is difficult for
orbitofrontal-damaged subjects to restrain their exploration of the riskier, disadvantageous decks."
Id
69. See PINCUS, Baselrimsdnt, stpra note 22, at 78 (stating that "[a]lmost all of the symptoms
associated with antisocial personality disorder can also be manifestations of frontal damage
(impulsiveness, poorwork history, aggressiveness, recklessness, little abilityto foresee consequences,
limited insight, limited remorse, indifference, lack of empathy, irresponsibility").
70. Id; sw Brower & Price, supra note 53, at 721 (discussing the association between ADHD
and prefrontal dysfunction); ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES
AND THE OVILZED MiND 130 (2001) (discussing the implication of frontal lobe dysfunction in
OCD).
71. For a more complete discussion of the problems incurred by labeling defendants as
[Vol. 16:2
FRONTAL LOBE DYSFUNCTION
This problem is compounded by the fact that frontally damaged individuals
regularly display no change on I.Q. tests. 2 Thus, an examiner may not suspect
brain damage or dysfunction because the subject's cognitive abilities appear to
be intact.73 The danger with such diagnoses is that they ignore a possible cause
for the antisocial behavior. A thorough assessment is necessary to reveal
whether antisocial behavior is a result of frontal lobe dysfunction or simply
indicative of APD.
Frontal lobe disorder can also resemble the symptoms of schizophrenia.74
Research indicates that schizophrenics exhibit abnormal frontal lobe
functioning.75 Both frontally damaged individuals and schizophrenics display
"affective changes, impaired motivation, [and] poor insight." 6 Numerous
diagnostic tests reveal that the frontal lobes of schizophrenic patients have
marked abnormalities.77 "These findings emphasize the importance of neuro-
logic and neuropsychologic investigation of patients with schizophrenia, using
methods that may uncover underlying frontal lobe disturbances, and the impor-
tant role that frontal lobe dysfunction may playin the development of schizo-
phrenic symptoms. '"78
Thorough testing is necessaryto determine whether a defendant is suffering
from frontal lobe dysfunction. An examination of the defendant's history is
essential to a proper diagnosis. In addition, disorders with similar manifesta-
tions, such as personality disorders and schizophrenia, must be ruled out with
proper neurological testing. Lawyers should payparticular attention to diagnoses
of personality disorder and consider additional testing in such cases.79
having personality disorders si, Terrence T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 487 (2004)
(analyzing Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433 (4th Cr. 2003)).
72. PrNCUS, Bze Itvti', s"pra note 22, at 78.
73. Se id (discussing the misdiagnosis of a defendant with frontal lobe dysfunction).
74. See Thimble, s"pr note 47, 14.
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id These abnormalities have been documented "in neuropathologic studies, in EEG
studies, in radiologic studies using CT measure, with MRI, and in cerebral blood flow (CBF) studies
... [and] in several studies using positron emission tomography (PET)." (internal citations
omitted). Id
78. Id
79. Lawyers should be aware that a diagnosis of personality disorder is dependent upon
whether or not the individual exhibited symptoms during childhood through adulthood. Sw AM.
PSYCI-IIATRICASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 645 (4th
ed. 1994) [hereinafter APA] (stating that APD is characterized bya "pervasive pattern of disregard
... that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood"). Thus, if a
defendant only recendydeveloped antisocial behaviors, lawyers should attempt to isolate the cause




The 19th century case of Phineas Gage ("Gage") exemplifies the unique
effect frontal lobe damage has on personality and morality." Gage was the
foreman of a crew hired to lay railroad tracks in Maine and was responsible for
handling the gunpowder used to blast rock.8 While setting up the blasting
powder, a premature explosion drove an iron bar through his head. 2 Although
the rod shot directly through Gage's frontal lobes, he survived.83 However,
Gage's injuries went well beyond the observable physical damage. Most notably,
the injury caused extreme changes in Gage's personality and judgment while
leaving his cognitive abilities intact; although Gage could "walk, talk, read, write,
calculate, and remember... [hie had become immoral and unethical."" He
"changed from a smart and energetic worker and a well-balanced man to a fitful,
irreverent man who was unemployable and indulged in gross profanity
publicly."" Gage's case is a striking example of the interconnection between
frontal lobe dysfunction and severe behavioral deficits. In and of themselves,
Gage's symptoms resemble what would today be labeled as APD.86 However,
the fact that these extreme personality changes were caused by isolated trauma
to the frontal lobes signified to researchers that apparent personality disorders
may in fact have an organic component. Gage's case is important because it
suggests that a person who acts immorally may in fact be suffering from brain
dysfunction.
Personality changes are also heavily documented in soldiers who have
sustained frontal lobe injuries." Studies of war veterans reveal a strong correla-
tion between head injuryand aggressive, antisocial behavior.88 Data collected by
German researchers following the first and second World Wars shows a signifi-
cant connection between "orbitofrontal lesions and subsequent antisocial behav-
80. See Cheryl L. Grady, N=vwmgiT and Aaitati cf the Fmnual Lom, in THE HUMAN
FRONTAL LOBES: FUNCIONS AND DISORDERS, supra note 21, at 196,197 (discussing the famous
case of Phineas Gage); PIN0JS, Base Itis, supra note 22, at 75 (recounting the story of Phineas
Gage).
81. PINus, BaseIan ars, supra note 22, at 75.
82. Id; SethMZv Weingarten, Psydswuey, inTHE HUMANFRONTALLOBES: FUNC OM AM
DISORDERS, s"pra note 21, at 446.
83. PINCUS, BasetImas, supra note 22, at 75.
84. Id
85. Weingarten, supra note 82, at 446.
86. PINCUS, Bze Instin , sup note 22, at 75.
87. Weingarten, s"pra note 82, at 446; se Brower & Price, sura note 53, at 721 (describing
the connection between antisocial behavior and frontal lobe injuries in veterans of the first and
second World Wars).
88. Brower & Price, supra note 53, at 721.
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iour."89 Similarly, the Vietnam Head Injury Study found that frontallydamaged
individuals exhibited higher rates of aggressive, violent, and antisocial behavior
than subjects without frontal lobe injuries.' Soldiers who suffered frontal lobe
trauma were more likelyto steal, get involved in physical altercations, and make
inappropriate sexual advances or comments.9'
Other studies have revealed how trauma or disease can cause "acquired
sociopathy" in adult subjects.92 In the case of the Virginia schoolteacher, a
tumor was responsible for causing the man to develop pedophilia.9' Adult onset
frontal lobe damage often leaves "previously established moral development"
intact while destroying impulse control and judgment.94 Thus, the individual
remains acutely aware of the immorality of his behavior, yet is unable to control
the sociopathic impulses. In addition, studies show that these types of frontally
damaged individuals may also "displaymarked deficits in real life tasks demand-
ing judgment, awareness of socially appropriate conduct, and the capacity to
assess future consequences" while only showing "minimal impairments on
standard neuropsychological tests of intelligence."' Thus, frontal lobe damage
maycause behavioral changes without disrupting a person's intellectual capacity.
One of the most famous studies concerning the connection between brain
functioning and criminal behavior was conducted in the 1990's by Adrian Raine
("Raine")." Raine examined the PET scans of 41 individuals convicted of either
murder or manslaughter.97 When compared with the brain scans of control
groups, the scans of the "murderers" showed significant metabolic decreases in
the frontal lobes.98 Unlike the high levels of frontal lobe activity in the control
group, the killers' frontal lobes were noticeably inactive. 9 Raine further sepa-
rated the "murderers" into two groups depending on the nature of the killing.' °





93. Se Burns & Swerdlow, s"im note 1, at 437 (describing the patient's "acquired
sociopathy").
94. Id at 438-39.
95. Brower & Price, s"~m note 53, at 721.
96. Potter, s"sra note 16, 2 (citing Adrian Raine et al., Brain A hmul in Muniermes
IrdariabyP itronEnssion Tw~gmt 42 BIoLOGY &PsYO-IIFATRY 495 (1997)).
97. Brower & Price, s"pra note 53, at 724, 726 n.59.
98. Id
99. Potter, supra note 16, 4-5.
100. Brower & Price, sra note 53, at 724.
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with "controlled, purposeful aggression to achieve a desired goal." 1 ' The second
group, labeled "affective" killers, was comprised of individuals whose crimes
were characterized by "impulsive, emotionally charged aggression." 2 Tests
revealed that the "affective" group exhibited low prefrontal activity, while the
"predatory" group's activitylevel was similar to the control group.' 3 Thus, the
study shows "a strong association between increased aggression and reduced
prefrontal cortical size or activity."" ° These brain scans are positive evidence
that frontal lobe deficits are associated with impulsive, rather than purposeful,
violent crimes. Raine's studies suggest that "murderers" who act in an impulsive,
uncontrolled manner, may in fact be suffering from significant frontal lobe
dysfunction."0
IlL BwidLg a De~fme
There are three ways in which evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction can be
used in a capital proceeding. During the guilt/innocence phase, evidence of
frontal lobe disorder may establish diminished capacity or form the basis for an
insanity defense. If frontal lobe evidence is rejected as a defense, or if it is
accepted but the defendant is found guilty nonetheless, it can be useful as
mitigation evidence at the penaltyphase. Using Virginia law as an example, this
section addresses the potential obstacles to admission of frontal lobe evidence
and the best ways to surmount those obstacles.
A. Dirmsbed CG adity
Evidence of diminished capacity is used to establish that the defendant's
mental condition prevented him from forming the mens rea necessaryto commit
the crime charged.'" In order to convict a defendant of capital murder, the





105. See id (stating that "clinically significant frontal lobe dysfunction is associated with
aggressive dyscontrol").
106. SeeROGERD. GROOT, QUMINALOFFENSES ANDDEFENSES INVIRGINIA 467-68 (West
2004 Virginia Practice Series) (quoting Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 880-81 (Va.
1881)). In Dame, the court stated:
[T]here are doubtless cases in which, whilst the prisoner may not be insane, in the
sense which exempts from punishment, yet he may be in that condition from partial
aberration or infeeblement of intellect wiich renders him incapable of sedate, deliber-
ate and specific intent necessary to constitute murder in the first degree.
Dearrte, 75 Va. at 880-81.
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premeditated" and must additionally prove at least one elevating fact.' In
capital cases, diminished capacity evidence functions by negating the existence
of premeditation and deliberation. 8 A successful diminished capacity defense
can reduce capital murder to second-degree non-premeditated murder. 9
In Stanper v Ca umaz1"0 the Supreme Court of Virginia explicitly
rejected the use of any mental state evidence, short of insanity, to establish a
diminished capacity defense."' The court stated that the "fundamental reason
for the exclusion of such evidence" was that:
The state of knowledge in the fields of medicine and psychiatry is
subject to constant advance and change. The classifications and grada-
tions aplied to mental illnesses, disoiders, and defects are frequently
revised.Te courts cannot, and should not, become dependent upon
these subtle and shifting gradations for the resolution of each specific
case.
112
The court firmly set the dividing line for criminal responsibility at the legal
standard for sanity and held that "[tihe shifting and subtle gradations of mental
illness known to psychiatryare useful onlyin determining whetherthe borderline
of insanity has been crossed."
113
Five years later, the Supreme Court of Virginia confirmed its holding in
Stanrper when it decided Snith u Qnrsiwhb."4 In Sni h, the defendant sought
to admit expert testimonythat he suffered from "alcohol dependence and from
a borderline personalitydisorder.""' Smith's expert contended that the defen-
dant's personality disorder had prevented him from "hav[ing] the capacity to
follow through on his intentions."" 6 Smith argued that the trial court should
have admitted the expert's testimonybecause it was relevant to premeditation."'
In addition, Smith contended that Stanrper was inapplicable because it involved
107. S& VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 2003) (listing the offenses that constitute
capital murder).
108. GROOT, supra note 106, at 468.
109. Id
110. 324 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 1985).
111. S& Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. 1985) (declining to adopt a
diminished capacity defense).
112. Id
113. Id The court stated that "[flor the purposes of determining criminal responsibility a
perpetrator is either legally insane or sane; there is no sliding scale of insanity." Id
114. Smith v. ommonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 871, 879-80 (Va. 1990).
115. Id at 879.
116. Id
117. Id The expert stated that Smith "had the ability to form intentions and to premeditate"
despite his inability to follow through with such intentions. Id
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a drug offense as opposed to a capital murder charge.' "Under Virginia law,
Smith says, it is clear that 'there exists a defense available onlyto capital or first
degree murder cases and not to any other offense.' "19 The defense argued that
if evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to negate premeditation,
evidence of Smith's inability to premeditate should likewise be admissible.12
Despite Smith's assertion, the Supreme Court of Virginia adhered to its decision
in Stanper and held that the mental functioning evidence was inadmissible. 2'
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Virginia again applied the rationale of
Stanperto uphold the trial court's exclusion of mental state evidence."n In Pp/
v ( nv1tb,2 the defendant sought to admit expert testimony"that he was
likely to interpret social situations differently than most people, that he had
problems with impulse control, and that he was likelyto jump to conclusions." 
124
Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the defendant's
arguments that his mental disability proved he acted in the heat of passion or,
alternatively, in self defense. 2 ' Relying on Stanper, the court stated that "[a]n
opinion that the defendant suffered a mental disabilitythat rendered him vulner-
able to misunderstanding a social situation is the type of gradation or classifica-
tion of the defendant's mental state too subtle and shifting to form the basis for
excusing his use of deadly force." 26
The holdings in Stanr, Snith, and PapI6 appear to prohibit the use of
frontal lobe dysfunction evidence to establish a diminished capacity defense in
Virginia. However, Smith's voluntary intoxication argument reveals a possible
avenue through which frontal lobe dysfunction evidence might be admissible to
establish diminished capacity. The Supreme Court of Virginia has allowed the
admission of voluntaryintoxication evidence in murder cases to negate premedi-
tation and deliberation.'27 Despite the Supreme Court of Virginia's apparent ban
on mental state evidence for non-insanity defenses, voluntary intoxication is
118. Id at 880.
119. Id
120. Sni , 389 S.E.2d at 880.
121. Id at 879-80.
122. SePeeples v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 382, 384-85 (Va. 1999) (upholding the trial
court's exclusion of expert testimony concerning the defendant's lack of impulse control).
123. 519 S.E.2d 382 (Va. 1999).
124. Pe*pe, 519 S.E.2d at 385.
125. Id at 383, 385.
126. Id
127. S&GROOT, s"p-a note 106, at 497 n.4 (citing Chittum v. Commonwealth, 174 S.E.2d 779
(Va. 1970)). In (Yma the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that " '[v]oluntary drunkenness,
where it has not produced permanent insanity, is rwwr an excuse for crime; etx where a party is
charged with murder, if it appear that the accused was too drunk to be capable of deliberating and
premediating [sic], then he can be convicted only of murder in the second degree.'" (litum 174
S.E.2d at 783 (alterations in original) (quoting Gills v. Commonwealth, 126 S.E. 51,53 (Va. 1925)).
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admissible to negate the existence of a mental state.' 8 The underlying reasoning
is that a defendant who is incapable of premeditating because he is intoxicated
could not have formed the requisite mental state, i.e. premeditation.129 Likewise,
a frontally damaged defendant's abilityto premeditate is impaired due to deficits
in planning, judgment, and impulse control. If voluntary intoxication evidence
is admissible to negate premeditation, then evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction
should also be admissible for that purpose.
In order to establish a successful diminished capacity defense, attorneys
must argue that frontal lobe dysfunction is the scientific equivalent of voluntary
intoxication. Frontal lobe dysfunction is analogous to voluntary intoxication in
that both are conditions which affect an individual's ability to premeditate.
Unlike insanity, in which the defendant must establish the existence of a mental
disezse, diminished capacity may be proven by evidence of a mental omi/i 1 3
"The frontal lobes of the brain are sensitive to low concentrations of alcohol,
resulting in alteration of thought and mood."' 3' Alcohol significantly affects
frontal lobe functioning, particularly a person's "awareness and self-control." '
Similarly to frontal lobe dysfunction, intoxication may cause an individual to
"become more aggressive and even violent.., or express abnormal desires and
drives normally kept under control."'3 In addition, both conditions weaken a
person's judgment, sense of morality, and sense of inhibition. 3 The physical
and behavioral similarities between frontal lobe dysfunction and voluntary
intoxication support the argument that the conditions operate in the same way
to affect a person's capacity to act deliberately and with premeditation.
The Virginia courts require a significant showing of intoxication in order
to get an intoxication juryinstruction.35 The defense has the burden of produc-
ing evidence of substantial intoxication.36 Despite the fact that the defense
bears this burden of production, the prosecution retains the ultimate burden of
128. GROOT, supra note 106, at 497.
129. Id; s& Wright v. Commonwealth, 363 S.E.2d 711, 712 (Va. 1988) (stating that "when a
person volutarilybecomes so intoxicated that he is incapable of deliberation or premeditation, he
cannot commit a class of murder that requires proof of a deliberate and premeditated killing").
130. Sehi iaPart III.B (discussing the "disease of mind" requirement for an insanitydefense).
131. David L. Faigman et aL, Tdt for Albd" Fomiic Issuf, in MODERN SaENIFIC




134. Fred Lane & Scott Lane, LANE GOLDSTEIN TRiAL TEa-INIQUE S 11:174 (3d ed. 2003),
WL GOLDTRTECH 11:174.
135. GROOT, sur note 106, at 498 (citing Lillyv. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522 (Va. 1998);
Jenkins v. Commonwealth 423 S.E.2d 360, 368-69 (Va. 1992)).
136. Id at 497-98.
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persuasion with regard to premeditation."' Expert testimony concerning the
extent of the defendant's impairment may prove invaluable to securing a jury
instruction."' Such evidence of extreme intoxication is necessary to establish
that the defendant lacked the abilityto pre-form an intent to kill. In the case of
frontallobe dysfunction, the defense should relyon expert testimonyto establish
that frontal lobe damage can limit the defendant's capacity for premeditation.
Once the defense meets its burden of production, by establishing the existence
of significant frontal lobe dysfunction, the prosecution bears the burden of
proving premeditation.
13 9
Frontal lobe dysfunction impairs premeditation in two ways. First, frontally
damaged individuals lack the ability to plan ahead and "to understand the
consequences of actions.""' Numerous studies conclusivelystate that "damage
to the frontal lobes causes the impairment of insight, impulse control, and
foresight."14' Diagnostic testing in case studies has revealed "marked deficits in
real life tasks demanding judgment, awareness of socially appropriate conduct,
and the capacity to assess future consequences142 Second, frontallobe dysfunc-
tion results in poor impulse control "which often leads to socially unacceptable
behavior." 4' Thus, a frontally damaged individual has a reduced capacity to
make appropriate decisions and physically control his impulses. It is both
illogical and arbitrarythat a diminished capacitydefense would be available to a
person who chooses to drink alcohol, but not to an individual stricken with a
physical disability.
The law is not the creation of such barbarous and insensible animal
nature as to extend a more lenient legal rule to the case of a drunkard,
whose mental faculties are disturbedbyhis own will and conduct, than
to the case of a poor demented creature afflicted by the hand of
God.'"
137. Id
138. Se Fitzgerald v. Comnmonwealh, 292 S.E2d 798, 807 (Va. 1982) (allowing a jury
instruction in cases in which the defendant's "condition was an issue of fact to be resolved by the
jury" in light of various expert testimony.
139. It is important to note that unlike an insanity claim, in which the defense bears the
burden of persuasion, the defense burden here is only one of production.
140. Si JONATHAN H PINCB & GARY TKXER, BEHAVIORAL NEUROLOGY 103 (1974)
(discussing the emotional effects of frontal lobe syndrome); Martin Wnkler, ADHD andFmnad
Lobe Dysfiriai 4t hp-J/web4heahiAnfo/en/answers/adhd-cause-frontalhtm (Sept. 4, 2003)
(stating that the frontal lobes control "intention, planning and goal direct behaviour").
141. Sm GOLDBERG, s"pa note 70, at 146 (discussing the connection between frontal lobe
damage and criminal behavior).
142. Brower & Price, s"qim note 53, at 721.
143. GOLDBERG, s"pm note 70, at 146.
144. State v. Noel, 133 A. 274,285 (N.J. 1926).
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Defense counsel should argue that by allowing a voluntaryintoxication defense,
the Supreme Court of Virginia opened the door to a diminished capacitydefense




The second wayin which frontal lobe dysfunction maybe used in a capital
proceeding is as insanityevidence. An insanitydefense, like a diminished capac-
itydefense, "bear[s] directlyon the defendant's criminal culpability."' Virginia's
test for insanity, first set forth in 1871 in Bcsudl u Cbin watd,' states that a
defendant is legallyinsane if he "was laboring under such a defect of reason from
disease of the mind... as not to know the nature and possible consequences of
his act, or if he did know, then that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong. " "' This test mirrors the M'Na2ten test, or the right/wrong test, which
has been adopted by federal statute and most state courts. 4" Virginia has
conclusively stated that its insanity test is to be read disjunctively such that the
first part of the test concerns the defendant's cognitive ability, and the second
145. GROOr, supra note 106, at 461.
146. 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860 (1871).
147. Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860, 868 (1871).
148. 18 U.S.C S 17 reads:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time
of the commission of the acts constituti the offense, the defendant, as a result of a
severe mental disease or defect, was unabl to appreciate the nature and qualityor the
wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a
defense.
... The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity byclear and convincing
evidence.
18 U.S.C S 17 (1999); seasoMYRONMOSKOVrr7, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAW 315
(5th ed. 2003) (stating that the M'Nagbrm test for insanity has been adopted by most jurisdictions).
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part focuses on his moral understanding."9 If the defendant satisfies either
portion of the test, he will be found legally insane.
The biggest obstacle to admission of frontal lobe evidence as the basis of
an insanitydefense is the language of the test itself. The first part of the insanity
test requires the defendant to have suffered from "a defect of reason from
disease ef nir' at the time he committed the offense.' Expert testimony is
necessary to establish the existence of an accepted "disease of mind."'' The
"disease of mind" requirement effectively acts to limit the types of mental
disabilities that qualify for an insanity defense. Unless the genesis of the prof-
fered disability is a diagnosable mental disease, the court will likely find the
evidence irrelevant to the question of insanity and hold it inadmissible. The
question then is whether the definition of "mental disease" is broad enough to
include frontal lobe dysfunction. The Virginia courts have not definitivelystated
whether the term "mental disease" refers onlyto widelyrecognized and accepted
conditions or whether it can include other disorders. In light of Staper, how-
ever, it is clear that the courts reject diagnoses that appear to relyon "subtle and
shifting gradations" of illnesses which "are frequently revised."" 2
In order to make an insanity claim in frontal lobe cases, the term "mental
disease" must encompass frontal lobe dysfunction. An Axis 1 diagnosis is
substantial proof that frontal lobe dysfunction qualifies as a disease for insanity
purposes."S3 According to section 310.1 of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders ("DSM"), changes in personality may be characterized asan Axis 1 disorder when the change results from a "general medical condi-
149. Se Price v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 106, 110 (Va. 1984) (holding "that the actual
M Nagta test for insanity, stated in the disjunctive, is the rule in Virginia). The two parts of the
insanity test and the different aspects of the defendant's understanding that they address can be
explained as follows:
The first portion relates to an accused who is psychqtic to an extreme degree. It
assumes an accused who because of mental disease, did not know the nature and
quality of his act; he siplydid not know what he was doi g. For example, in crushing
the skull of ahuman bemn with an iron bar, he believed that he was smashing a glass
jar. The latter poron of MNaghten relates to an accused who knew the nature and
quality of his act. He knew what he was doing; he knew that he was crushin the skull
of a human beinE with an iron bar. However, because of mental disease, he did not
know that what lhe was doing was wrong. He believed, for example, that he was
carrying out a command from God.
2 -IARLEs E. TORaA, WHARTON'S QRMINAL LAW S101 (15th ed. 1994) (citations omitted).
150. GROCr, s"r note 106, at 462.
151. Id (stating that although laytestimonyis helpfulin establishing "the defendant's attitude
and demeanor in order to bolster his insanity defense," an expert must first testifythat the defen-
dant does in fact suffer from the disease). If, before trial, an indigent defendant shows probable
cause that his sanity will be an issue, the court is required to provide an expert to perform a sanity
evaluation. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-169.5(A) (vfichie 2000).
152. Staner, 324 S.E.2d at 688.
153. SeAPAstq'anote 79, at25 (explainingthe multiaxial classifications of mentaldisorders).
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tion." 4 The essential requirement of section 310.1 is that the personalitychange
is "de tothe direct physiological effects of a general medical condition."' Thus,
the personality change must be traceable to a condition and must demonstrate
a marked change from the individual's prior functioning. Examples of personal-
ity change are "affective instability, poor impulse control, [and] outbursts of
aggression."' 56 Certain types of frontal lobe dysfunction, such as dysfunction
resulting from head trauma, qualify for this type of Axis I diagnosis.' It is also
likely that dysfunction related to a tumor or other disease would satisfy the
diagnostic criteria for a section 310.1 diagnosis.' In capital cases in which the
defendant's frontal lobe damage resulted from these types of discrete causes, an
Axis 1 diagnosis is appropriate. However, in cases in which no "general medical
condition" can be identified, it is unlikely that the defendant's disorder will be
reported on Axis 1.
Another wayto showthat frontal lobe dysfunction is a "mental disease" for
an insanity defense is by analogizing frontal lobe dysfunction to schizophrenia,
which is an Axis 1 condition that is generallyrecognized as a disease of mind for
purposes of an insanity claim.'59 Studies show that schizophrenics exhibit
"abnormalities of frontal lobe function."" 6 Both conditions cause "affective
changes, impaired motivation, [and] poor insight." 161 PET scans reveal decreased
metabolic frontal lobe activity in schizophrenic patients.'62 In addition, both
frontally damaged individuals and schizophrenics display similarly poor perfor-
mance on neuropsychological tests that indicate cognitive dysfunction associated
154. Se id at 171 (explaining the Axis 1 classification "Personality Change Due to a General
Medical Condition").
155. Id at 171 (emphasis added).
156. Id The DSM also states that "injuryto the frontal lobes mayyield such symptoms as lack
of judgment or foresight, facetiousness, disinhibition, and euphoria." Id
157. S& id at 172 (listing the types of conditions which qualify as a "general medical condi-
tion").
158. Id
159. APA, um note 79, at 26. The acceptance of an insantydefense based on schizophrenia
depends, of course, on whether the defense can prove that the defendant was suffering from the
effects of the disease "at the time of the act" GROOT, s"pra note 106, at 462; seeAke v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 72 (1985) (discussing the significance of defense counsel's failure to elicit testimony
from defense experts stating that the defendant was suffering from schizophrenia "at dte 6wjrmfie
160. s$Thimble, sura note 47, 115 (discussing the evidence showing frontal lobe dysfunction
in schizophrenic patients); Massimo Abbruzzese et al., FrovalLod erfutm inMetallllrs, 4
PSY-OLOQUY 1.2 (1993), at http://psycprints.ecs.sotoraac.uk/archive/00000
303/ (stating that CT scans on schizophrenics reveal frontal lobe abnormalities).
161. Thimble, su"ra note 47, 14.
162. Abbruzzese, s"pra note 160, 1.2.
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with the frontal lobes.'63 The physical, psychological, and behavioral similarities
between the two conditions are useful evidence for an argument that frontal lobe
dysfunction should be considered a legitimate disease for insanity purposes.
It is important to note that the problem of defining frontal lobe dysfunction
as a "mental disease" does not exist in jurisdictions that follow the Model Penal
Code's ("MPC') test for insanity. The MPC test states that a person is not
criminally responsible for conduct resulting from "mental disease or defk." "
This language is broader than the language followed by Virginia in that it in-
cludes no limitation on the genesis of the condition. An insanitydefense based
on frontal lobe dysfunction can easily qualify as "a defect" for purposes of the
MPC test. The distinction between the two tests illustrates how narrow the
M'Nagken test is in terms of which conditions qualify for an insanity defense.
Because of the difficultyin categorizing generalized frontal lobe dysfunction
as a mental disease, it is unlikely that it can satisfy the M'Nagten test. Even if
frontal lobe dysfunction could be characterized as a mental disease, it still may
not satisfyeither branch of the M'Nagentest. The first part of the test, whether
the defendant understood the nature and consequences of his actions, addresses
the defendant's "cognitive or perceptive abilities." 6 ' Depending on the cause,
location, and extent of the frontal lobe damage, the defendant mayretain normal
intellectual functioning.66 For example, a frontallydamaged individual maystill
be able to understand that pointing a gun at another person and pulling the
trigger mayresult in that person's death. Therefore, in most cases the first part
of the M'Na ,ten test will not encompass a frontally damaged defendant. Addi-
tionally, frontal lobe damage would not satisfy the second part of Virginia's
insanitytest because it addresses the defendant's moral understanding. Although
frontally damaged individuals may act immorally, they still know "that the act is
considered morally reprehensible by society."167 For example, the Virginia
schoolteacher "went to great lengths to conceal his activities because he felt that
theywere unacceptable."' 68 If a defendant retains the capacityto understand that
his actions are wrong, he cannot be found insane under the second part of the
M'Nagdxen test. Thus, it is unlikely that a frontally damaged individual will be
found insane under the standard M'Na,,ten test.
163. Id 5.1. Both conditions appear to cause poor performance on the Weigl Sorting Test
("WST") and the Word Fluency Test ('WFr'). Id The WST assesses a person's ability to "shift
from one strategy to another" and the WFT assesses "verbal fluency." Id 3.2, 3.3.
164. SeTORaA, supranote 149, § 104, at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting MODELPENALCODE
4.01(1) (1985)).
165. GROOT, supra note 106, at 462.
166. See PINCUS, Base Istin=s, supra note 22, at 75 (discussing how Phineas Gage, after
suffering severe frontal lobe damage, retained the ability to "walk, talk, read, write, calculate, and
remember").
167. GROOT, supr note 106, at 463.




For a frontally damaged defendant who fails the M'Nasten test, an irresist-
ible impulse instruction might save him from conviction. In Darnatev Cowtm
v/th,"1 the Supreme Court of Virginia supplemented its insanity test with an
irresistible impulse doctrine. 7 ' The court affirmed the trial judge's instruction
to the jurythat a defendant's actions maybe excused if he was compelled byan
irresistible impulse.' The court explained that an irresistible impulse is "a
diseased state of the mind, the tendency of which is to break out in a sudden
paroxysm of violence, venting itself in homicide or other dangerous and violent
acts upon friend and foe indiscriminately." 2 However, the court stated that the
question of irresistible impulse only arises after a determination that the defen-
dant was able to tell right from wrong.73 As set forth in Diarntte, the irresistible
impulse doctrine is only applicable when the defendant "know[s] that if he does
the act he will do wrong and receive punishment" but nonetheless "is incapable
of resisting" the criminal impulse.'74 Therefore, a defendant must first prove
that he is sane, in that he knew right from wrong, before he can argue that his
actions were compelled by an irresistible impulse. 75
The focus of an irresistible impulse inquiryis whether a defendant's "mind
has become so impaired by disease that he is totally deprived of the mental
power to control or restrain his act."' 76 As in the M'Nag1,n test, the irresistible
impulse test requires the defendant to prove that he was suffering from a
"disease of mind" at the time he committed the act.' Thus, the same strict
limitation on the genesis of the disorder recurs in the irresistible impulse test.
In Ga-y v C u& dtb,"' the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's rejection of the defendant's irresistible impulse claim.' 9 At trial, the
defense presented psychiatric testimony that the defendant suffered from
169. 75 Va. 867 (Va. 1881).




174. Se id (stating that an irresistible impulse is "an irresistible inclination to kill or commit
some other offence- some unseen pressure on the mind, drawing it to consequences which it sees,
but cannot avoid, and placing it under a coercion which, while its results are clearlyperceived, it is
incapable of resisting").
175. GROOT, s"pra note 106, at 463.
176. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (Va. 1952).
177. SeeHerbin v. Commonwealth, 503 S.E.2d 226, 231 (Va. 1998) (stating that "a defendant
must present more than a scintilla of evidence of a mental disease in order to receive a jury instruc-
tion").
178. 343 S.E.2d 368 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
179. Godleyv. Commonwealth, 343 S.E.2d 368, 369 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
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borderline personality disorder and had problems with impulse control8
However, the court of appeals found that "[t]he psychiatric testimony was
inconclusive on the issue of irresistible impulse."' The court stated that
"[a]lthough Godleymayhave had 'trouble with impulse control,' neither psychia-
trist testified that he was 'totally deprived of the mental power to control or
restrain' himself from shooting his girlfriend."'
Gdll is significant because of what it does, and does not, focus on in its
discussion of irresistible impulse. The court did not focus on whether the
defendant's personality and impulse control disorder constituted a disease of
mind. Rather, the court focused on whether these disorders affected the defen-
dant to the degree that he was totallyunable to control his actions. Although the
question of "disease of mind" is still relevant, "irresistible impulse is solely a
question of ability to control behavior known to be wrong."8 3
Recent Virginia court decisions have markedly narrowed the irresistible
impulse defense. In Benmwt v Ca nmLih,'4 the Virginia Court of Appeals
stated that "[e]vidence that an accused planned his or her criminal acts precludes,
as a matter of law, any finding that the accused acted under an irresistible im-
pulse." ' Unlike the broad irresistible impulse defense laid out in Doarnew, the
newly limited defense is unavailable if there is any evidence that the defendant
premeditated his actions."' The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has stated that "[impulsivityis the essence of this definition of insanity;,
planning or deliberative conduct is inconsistent with the defense."" 7 Defense
attorneys should be aware of this strict limitation if theyplan to use an irresistible
impulse defense in a frontal lobe dysfunction case. Although irresistible impulse
creates the best chance for an insanitydefense, the Virginia courts will not allow
an instruction if the Commonwealth produces evidence of premeditation.
According to Berw, premeditation and irresistible impulse are mutually exclu-
sive. If the prosecution successfullyproves that the defendant acted in a planned
or deliberate manner, an irresistible impulse argument will necessarily fail. Thus,
the defense must aggressively counter evidence of premeditation in order to
preserve an irresistible impulse defense.
180. Id
181. Id at 370.
182. Id
183. GROOT, s"qra note 106, at 463 (citing 7Txnpo, 70 S.E.2d at 292).
184. 511 S.E.2d 439 (Va. Cc. App. 1999).
185. Bennett v. Commonwealth, 511 S.E.2d 439, 447 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
186. SeeRollins v. Commonwealth, 151 S.E.2d 622, 625 (Va. 1966) (stating that "[tlhe word
'impulse' implies that which is sudden, spontaneous, [and] unpremeditated").




The final wayin which evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction can be used in
a capital proceeding is as mitigation evidence. If the defendant is convicted in
the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction
should be a major factor in the sentencing phase. During a capital sentencing
proceeding, evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction is admissible as mitigation
evidence. Section 19.2-264.4(B) of the Virginia Code states that the defendant
maypresent facts that establish that "the capital felonywas committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance"
or that "at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminalityof his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law was significantly impaired."' 188
Under the United States Supreme Court's decisions in L odeet v Ovid 9 and
Eddir C b,19 ° it is clear that the sentencer in a capital case cannot be
precluded from hearing evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction."' In Lodett the
Court "conclude[d] that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from
considering, as a nirgaigfaaor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and anyof the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death." 92 The Court reiterated this holding in Eddi*
and stated "that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any
relevant mitigating factor."'93 Evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction is relevant
to both the defendant's character and the circumstances of the offense. Thus,
according to Lkodeet and Eddirg, evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction must be
admitted during the sentencing phase of a capital proceeding.
Two clauses of section 19.2-264.4(B) are particularlyrelevant to the admissi-
bilityof frontal lobe dysfunction evidence. The first of these two clauses allows
the defendant to introduce evidence "of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance." 94 Unlike insanityand irresistible impulse, this rule contains no limitation
on the genesis of the type of mental condition evidence presented. Thus, this
clause is much broader than the M'Na'xen test for insanity or the irresistible
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 192-264.4(B)(i, (iv) (Michie Supp. 2003).
189. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
190. 455 US. 104 (1982).
191. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (pluality opinion) (holding that the sentencer
inacapital case must consider all mitigating evidence); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,113-14
(1982) (stating that "[j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering
any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a mater q/az any relevant
mitigating evidence").
192. Laoka, 438 US. at 604 (pluralityopinion).
193. EdAr, 455 U.S. at 112.
194. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B)(i) (4icWe Supp. 2003).
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impulse doctrine. The second clause that concerns the introduction of frontal
lobe evidence allows evidence showing that the defendant's ability"to conform
his conduct to the requirements of lawwas significantlyinpaired."" Of the two
clauses, the second is more relevant to the introduction of frontal lobe evidence
because the language is concerned with the defendant's lack of self-control. As
discussed previously, frontal lobe dysfunction can damage impulse control while
leaving intellectual function intact. Thus, it is the effect of the dysfunction on
the defendant's abilityto restrain his conduct that is of primaryimportance in the
mitigation context.
By presenting mitigating evidence that the defendant lacks the ability to
control his conduct, defense counsel runs the risk of inadvertentlyproving future
dangerousness. The defendant's lack of impulse control may support an infer-
ence "that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society."96 When the defendant's conduct is the
result of a tumor which is subsequentlyexcised, there is no danger in proving the
future dangerousness aggravator. If frontal lobe dysfunction is caused by
another type of disease or trauma, the sentencer may infer that the defendant's
condition is permanent. However, frontal lobe dysfunction often works in
conjunction with other factors to exacerbate criminality.97 When those other
factors, such as alcohol and drugs, are removed from the defendant's environ-
ment his behavior may improve despite an existing neurological impairment.'
In addition, medications used to treat behavioral problems, such as Ritalin, anti-
depressants, or mood stabilizers, mayhelp treat frontallydamaged individuals.' 99
In general, the benefit of introducing evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction in
mitigation outweighs the risk of inadvertently proving future dangerousness.
The effects of frontal lobe damage are well documented and offer compelling
reasons for sentencing a defendant to life imprisonment instead of death.
IV. Geu the'Jwy to Unietand
One of the biggest obstacles to presenting a defense based on frontal lobe
dysfunction is the jury itself. People often have the "tendency to conceive of
moral and ethical judgments as coming from some source other than the
brain."" 0 For instance, it is a commonly held belief that a person's sense of
"moralityand ethics" is connected to the spiritual self as opposed to the physical
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv).
196. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C).
197. See Pincus, A ssion; supra note 49, at 550 (stating that neither "intoxication, psychosis,
or frontal damage alone, is sufficient to cause violence").
198. Id
199. Id at 555.
200. PINCuIS, Base I5t6r=, s"pa note 22, at 74.
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self.2 0 1 Jurors may think of morality and free will in terms of the soul or the
mind as opposed to thinking of them as a function controlled bythe brain. This
tendency to separate the nird from the brain can negatively impact a case based
on a frontal lobe dysfunction defense. Relevant scientific evidence will be
unpersuasive if the jury does not understand the role the brain plays in allowing
individuals to express their morality
This analogy mayhelp: The only way in which a composer can pres-
ent to an audience w-at he has conceived is by having his musical
composition performed byan orchestra. In a similar way, the expres-
sion of a person's will must involve the brain. The brain is the sym-
phony orchestra of a person's spirit.' °2
If an orchestra plays with broken instruments it is probable that it will perform
poorly despite the composer's efforts to write a good piece of music.23 Sini-
larly, if a person's brain does not function properly he may act inappropriately
despite his best intentions. 4 Just as a well written piece of music cannot sound
good when played with broken instruments, a well-formed sense of moralitycan
go astraywhen processed by a dysfunctional brain.
Lawyers must recognize that jurors enter the courtroom with notions of
morality and free will that do not immediately dissipate upon learning about
frontal lobe dysfunction. Using the Virginia schoolteacher as an example, it is
easy to see how jurors could reject the argument that the tumor turned the man
into a pedophile overnight. Most people are inherently resistant to the idea that
an injury could rob them of free will and cause them to commit crimes such as
molesting children. Because juries are forced to make moral value judgments in
criminal cases, defense attorneys cannot ask them to separate ideas of morality
from their decision-making process. Instead of fighting this tendency, attorneys
should integrate a discussion of morality into an explanation of frontal lobe
dysfunction.
It is essential for lawyers to explain that a frontally damaged individual is
not necessarily an immoral individual. In fact, research shows that frontal lobe
damage does not destroy a person's sense of morality.' Lawyers need to
emphasize that there is an important difference between i ngimmoral and acatg
immoral. A defendant who art immorally as a result of a physical disability is
arguably not as culpable as a defendant who simply is immoral. Frontally dam-
aged individuals should not be sentenced based upon a mere determination of
201. Id
202. Id at 75.
203. Id
204. Id
205. Burns & Swerdlow, supra note 1, at 438-39.
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morality. The jury must understand that frontal lobe dysfunction acts as an
impediment to moral behavior and therefore lessens the defendant's culpability.
V. Cbnion
Frontal lobe dysfunction is ripe for consideration as a valid defense in
capital proceedings and as strong mitigation evidence during sentencing. A
diminished capacity argument must focus on the inability of a frontallydamaged
individual to premeditate due to deficits in executive functioning and poor
impulse control. In addition, an analogy to voluntary intoxication is a helpful
way of showing why frontal lobe damage reduces culpability. If the defense
intends to present an insanity defense, expert testimony will be necessary to
establish that frontal lobe dysfunction is a recognizable "mental disease." Once
it has been established that the defendant knew right from wrong, an irresistible
impulse instruction provides the best opportunity for a successful insanity
defense. However, attorneys must be aware that Virginia courts are likelyto be
reluctant to accept frontal lobe dysfunction as a defense. The strongest use for
evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction is during the sentencing proceeding as
mitigation evidence. The defense must use such evidence to show that the
defendant was unable to "conform his conduct to the requirements of law" and
should therefore receive life imprisonment.2°6 Despite the difficulties in using
evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction in capital proceedings, it is an important
defensive avenue that must be pursued.
206. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (Michie Supp. 2003).
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